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Abstract 
In this paper we adopt a theory of class positions based on employment 
relations to assess what implications individuals’ class positions have for their 
economic life. In particular we consider economic security (the risk of 
unemployment), economic stability (the variability component in earnings) and 
economic prospects (lifetime earnings profiles). Our findings provide empirical 
support for the theory itself and little evidence for the currently fashionable 
claims of the decline, or even death, of class in today’s society. 
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Introduction 
This paper starts out from a theory of social class that has been presented more 
fully elsewhere (Goldthorpe, 2000b: ch. 10). The theory was developed together 
with a class schema for use in empirical research that has by now become quite 
widely adopted, especially in social mobility research, and is variously known 
as the Goldthorpe, Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero or CASMIN schema. The 
new British National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC), 
introduced in 2001, represents a further instantiation of the schema (Rose and 
O'Reilly, 1997, 1998; Rose and Pevalin, 2003). Table 1 shows the 
correspondence that exists between the classes of the original schema and those 
of the NS-SEC in its seven-class ‘analytical’ version.1 Both classifications will 
be applied in the course of the paper. 
 
Under the theory in question, class positions are seen as deriving from social 
relations in economic life or, more specifically, from employment relations. It 
is, therefore, in economic life that the implications for individuals of the class 
positions that they hold should be most immediately apparent. The main 
purpose of the paper is to show that this is indeed the case, so far at least as 
contemporary British society is concerned, and, in particular, in regard to (i) 
economic security, (ii) economic stability and (iii) economic prospects. 
 
In this way, empirical support can be provided for the theory itself and also 
further confirmation of the validity of the social classifications that are 
associated with it. At the same time, the findings reported serve to undermine 
currently fashionable arguments claiming the decline, or even death, of class in 
the context of the ‘post-modern’ societies of the ‘global era’ (see further 
Goldthorpe, 2000a).  
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Table 1: Correspondence of the Classes of the Goldthorpe Schema and of 
the NS-SEC Socio-Economic Classification and Common Descriptive 
Terms 
Goldthorpe schema NS-SEC Common 
descriptive term 
I Professional, administrative 
and managerial employees, 
higher grade ab 
 
1 Higher managerial and 
professional occupations ab 
II Professional, administrative 
and managerial employees, 
lower grade;b   technicians, 
higher grade 
 
2 Lower managerial and 
professional occupations b 
Salariat (or service 
class) 
IIIa Routine nonmanual 
employees, higher grade 
 
3 Intermediate occupations Intermediate white-
collar 
IV Small employers and self-
employed workers 
 
4 Employers in small 
organisations, own account 
workers 
Independents (or 
petty bourgeoisie) 
V Supervisors of manual 
workers; technicians, lower 
grade 
 
5 Lower supervisory and 
lower technical 
occupations 
Intermediate blue-
collar 
VI Skilled manual workers 
 
6 Semi-routine occupations 
IIIb Routine nonmanual workers, 
lower grade 
 
7 Routine occupations 
VII Semi- and unskilled manual 
workers 
 
  
Working class 
 
Notes:   
a. Includes ‘large’ employers (see Goldthorpe, 1997). 
b. Includes independent professionals (see Goldthorpe, 1997) 
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The theory and the schema 
Since class positions are taken to derive from employment relations, the 
positions of employers, self-employed workers and employees represent an 
initial level of differentiation. However, in modern societies major importance 
will attach to the further differentiation that is obviously required among 
employees, who make up the large majority of the active population. This can 
be achieved, in a theoretically consistent way, by reference to the mode of 
regulation of their employment or, in other words, to the form of their 
employment contracts, due account being taken of both explicit and implicit 
features.2 
 
Central to the theory in this respect is the following claim. Employers face 
contractual hazards in the labour market, ultimately on account of the essential 
‘incompleteness’ of all employment contracts but, more immediately, on 
account of the two problems of work monitoring and of human asset specificity. 
In consequence, contracts of differing form are offered to employees who are 
engaged to carry out different kinds of work in which these problems arise to a 
greater or lesser extent. The situation thus envisaged can be represented 
schematically as in Figure 1 (adapted from Goldthorpe, 2000b: Fig. 10.2). 
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Figure 1: Dimensions of Work as Sources of Contractual Hazard, Forms of 
Employment Contract and Location of Classes 
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The detailed arguments underlying Figure 1 will not here be rehearsed, although 
they will be introduced, as relevant, in interpreting the empirical findings that 
are later reported. For the moment, it will be sufficient to note three salient 
points. 
(i) Those classes of the Goldthorpe schema and likewise of NS-SEC that fall 
in bottom-left quadrant of Figure1 and that could together be taken as 
representing the working class (see Table 1) are associated with the 
regulation of employment via a ‘labour contract’: i.e. an approximation to 
a simple if recurrent spot contract for the purchase of a quantity of labour 
on a piece- or time-rate basis. This approximation will be closest in the 
case of non-skilled, entirely routine workers (Classes IIIb and VII/7), 
with modifications being most likely in the case of skilled manual and 
semi-routine workers (Classes VI/6). 
(ii) Those classes that fall into the upper-right quadrant of Figure 1 and that 
together represent the salariat (or service class)3 of professional and 
managerial employees are associated with the regulation of employment 
via a ‘service relationship’: i.e. a contractual exchange of a relatively 
long-term and diffuse kind in which compensation for service to the 
employing organisation comprises a salary and various perquisites and 
also important prospective elements – salary increments, expectations of 
continuity of employment (or at least of employability) and promotion 
and career opportunities. The service relationship will most fully realised 
with higher-level professionals and managers (Classes I/1), while 
modified forms will be most common with lower-level professionals and 
managers (Classes II/2). 
(iii) Those (employee) classes that fall into the two ‘reverse’ quadrants of 
Figure 1 and that are characterised as ‘intermediate’ between the working 
class and salariat (i.e. Classes IIIa and V/3 and 5) are associated with the 
regulation of employment via ‘mixed’ forms of contract in which 
elements of both the labour contract and service relationship will be 
found.4 
 
In the next three sections of the paper, versions of either the class schema or the 
NS-SEC are used as the basis for examining, in turn, class differences in 
economic security, economic stability and economic prospects in Britain over 
the last twenty-five years or so. In some instances, already published research 
findings are adapted to present purposes; in others, original analyses are made 
of standard data-sets. 
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Economic security 
The most obvious way in which individuals’ class positions are likely to 
influence their economic security is through the associated risks of job loss and 
unemployment. In order to investigate the extent and pattern of such risks, 
longitudinal data in the form of individuals’ complete work histories, including 
information on any episodes of unemployment, are desirable. One major study 
based on such data is that by Gallie et al. (1998).  
 
Using work histories from representative samples of both employed and 
unemployed individuals in Great Britain in 1992, Gallie and his colleagues 
document a general increase in job insecurity from the 1970s onwards – as 
might indeed be expected in view of the return of recessions in which rates of 
unemployment reached ‘double-digit’ levels. However, they also find that 
throughout the period in question the risks of unemployment remained clearly 
linked with class position and that no tendency for this association to weaken 
was apparent.  
 
Thus, disparity ratios show (Gallie et al., 1998: 143, Table 5.7) that for the year 
1979 the risk of a nonskilled manual worker (Class VII) becoming unemployed 
rather than remaining in work was around three times greater, and that of a 
skilled manual worker (Class VI) around two-and-a-half times greater, than that 
of a professional or managerial employee (Classes I+II). For the years 1980-4 
and 1985-9, these differential risks did narrow slightly but then for the years 
1990-2 they returned to almost exactly the same pattern as for 1979. 
Furthermore, when various individual characteristics were introduced into the 
analysis, including that of level of educational attainment, the outcome was not 
radically changed: class position, taken as a structural factor, remained of 
‘critical’ importance in vulnerability to unemployment. 
 
For present purposes, these findings have two limitations. First, they extend 
only up to the early 1990s and, second, ‘intermediate’ classes are left out of 
account. Fortunately, more recent results are now available that, while not 
directly comparable to those produced by Gallie and his colleagues, do none the 
less provide valuable complementary evidence. 
 
Elias and McKnight (2003) use the data-set of the British Household Panel 
Survey in order to carry out analyses of the relationship between class position 
and the risk of unemployment, in which class is determined according to NS-
SEC and the experience of unemployment is measured in two different ways: 
first, according to whether an individual in the active labour force had or had 
not been unemployed at any time between September, 1991 and August, 1999; 
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and second, according to whether over this same eight-year period an individual 
had or had not spent a total of more than twelve months in unemployment. Elias 
and McKnight carry out logistic regressions in which these two binary measures 
are the dependent variables and class is the explanatory variable of interest, but 
with age, sex, marital status and family composition also being included as 
control variables. Figure 2 graphs their main results. 
 
As regards the experience of any episode of unemployment, the influence of 
class is readily apparent from Figure 2, although the main contrast to emerge is 
not so much one between the effects of being in the working class rather than in 
the salariat as between the effects of being a ‘blue-collar’ employee (Classes 5, 
6 and 7) rather than a ‘white-collar’ employee (Classes 1, 2 and 3).5 Moreover, 
it is among independents or the petty bourgeoisie (Class 4) that there is the 
lowest risk of experiencing unemployment, although underemployment does of 
course in their case represent another possible source of economic insecurity. 
 
As regards the experience of recurrent or long-term unemployment, amounting 
to more than twelve months in total, the contrast that stands out is much closer 
to that shown up by Gallie et al.: i.e. between the effects of belonging to the 
working class, and especially its lower division, rather than to the salariat, and 
especially its higher division. In multiplicative terms, being a routine worker 
(Class 7) increases the odds of recurrent or long-term unemployment almost 
fourfold relative to the odds for a higher-level professional or managerial 
employee (Class 1). In addition, Figure 2 shows the independents now falling, 
along with the two intermediate employee classes, in-between the working class 
and the salariat, with extensive unemployment being here indicative, one would 
suppose, of some form of business failure. 
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Figure 2: Coefficients for Effects of Class on Risks (Log Odds) of Experiencing Unemployment 1991-1999 
(Controlling for Age, Sex, Marital Status and Family Composition) 
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Taking both graphs of Figure 2 together, one can then say that over the last 
decade of the twentieth century, just as previously, class position remained very 
clearly linked to the incidence and length of unemployment, and even with due 
account being taken of a range of individual factors. Thus, the argument made 
by Beck (2000: 153) that in the global era the risks of unemployment become 
less and less class-related is, for Britain at least, quite unfounded. And the 
claims of other globalisation theorists such as Castells (1996/2000: 290) or Gray 
(1998: 29, 71-2, 111) to the effect that, in consequence of a ‘generalisation’ of 
insecurity, the ‘bourgeois’ institution of the career is now being undermined 
have to be seen as, at all events, highly exaggerated. It is true that former 
members of the salariat now represent a growing proportion of those individuals 
who at any one time are found in unemployment. But this can be accounted for 
simply as the result of professional and managerial employees making up a 
growing proportion of the total work force, and says nothing about relative risks 
(cf Gallie et al., 1998: 142-3). Jobs are still far more likely to be lost than are 
careers to be disrupted. 
 
Moreover, not only is the association between class position and the risk of 
unemployment a robust one; from the theoretical standpoint earlier outlined, 
class position is itself to be regarded as having causal significance. In particular, 
members of the working class, and nonskilled, routine workers in particular, 
must be seen as facing relatively high risks of job loss and unemployment as a 
direct result of the typical form that their employment contracts take. The 
crucial point here is that the basic labour contract approximates a spot contract 
for the purchase of a quantity of labour and thus, even if recurrent, tends to 
carry with it few expectations, explicit or implicit, of long-term continuity. 
Where problems of work monitoring or of human asset specificity are slight, 
there is in fact little incentive for employers to set up such expectations. Rather, 
they will aim to ‘commodify’ labour to the greatest degree possible, so that 
when they need less of this commodity they will have maximum freedom 
simply to stop buying it.  
 
Most obviously, routine wage-workers tend to be employed on only short 
periods of notice, whether formally or by ‘custom and practice’. As a result, not 
only is it generally easier for employers to dismiss or lay off such workers (cf. 
Gallie et al., 1998: 139-41) but, further, if they do lose their jobs, for whatever 
reason, there is a relatively high probability that they will then become 
unemployed for some period simply because they will have only quite limited 
time in which to find alternative work. In contrast, salaried employees typically 
work to longer periods of notice – usually at least a month – and therefore have 
much better chances, even in the event of job loss, of avoiding unemployment.6  
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In addition, wage-workers are generally less well protected than are salaried 
staff against employment insecurity arising from ill-health, which has been 
shown to be an especially important factor in long-term unemployment (White, 
1983). The superior fringe benefits that members of the salariat typically enjoy 
mean that they are better able to maintain continuity of employment on the basis 
of extended sick-leave or, in the case of older workers, to avoid entering 
unemployment by taking up early retirement pensions. 
 
Although, then, vulnerability to job loss and unemployment is of course in 
various ways affected by individual as well as structural factors – as indeed by 
other structural factors apart from class – the persisting centrality of class in 
creating differentials in this respect is apparent enough.7 In turn, there would 
seem little reason to modify White’s view (1991:110) that a relatively high risk 
of unemployment, and thus of economic insecurity, is ‘inherent to the 
condition’ of those individuals holding working-class positions, as these 
positions are here understood. 
 
Economic stability 
As well as being a major determinant of their longer-term economic security, 
the class positions that individuals hold can also be expected to influence their 
economic lives in the shorter-term – that is, from week to week and month to 
month – through the consequences that follow for the stability of earnings. In 
the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, the problem of instability in 
earnings, especially among the working class, was widely recognised. Working-
class families, even if they avoided the worst consequences of unemployment 
and managed to keep above the poverty line, could still meet with serious 
difficulties of housekeeping and budgeting through fluctuations in their 
breadwinners’ earnings (cf. Johnson, 1985). Today, it may seem that such 
problems have largely disappeared as a result of general improvements in wages 
and conditions of employment and in state social security provision. However, 
even if this is true, it does not follow that the connection between class and 
fluctuation in earnings no longer exists, nor that such fluctuation is unimportant. 
 
Earnings data that would allow the matter to be examined directly are not, 
unfortunately, available but one data-set, that of the New Earnings Survey, does 
provide information that is of relevance and that merits more attention than it 
has so far received. The NES data are obtained each year directly from 
employers’ pay-rolls for a sample of employees randomly selected on the basis 
of their National Insurance numbers, and can thus claim higher quality than 
earnings data collected through individuals’ responses in interviews or to 
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questionnaires.8 Information is available that allows the ‘make-up’ of gross 
earnings in different occupations to be analysed according to four categories: 
i.e. three categories of variable pay – all forms of ‘payment by results’, overtime 
earnings, and shift and other premiums – and a fourth, residual category, ’all 
other pay’. This latter category cannot be entirely equated with fixed or ‘basic’ 
pay, chiefly, it appears, because it includes the pay of workers on time-rates that 
is variable in the sense that their contracts do not specify any normal or standard 
hours. None the less, it would seem possible to treat ‘all other pay’ as in general 
giving a good indication of basic pay, and it thus becomes possible to make 
comparisons of the relative importance of variable forms of pay in the total 
earnings of different groups of worker, even if the actual amount of variation 
that is produced at the individual level remains unknown.9  
 
The occupational classifications used by the NES have changed over the years 
and none map readily into either the Goldthorpe class schema or NS-SEC. 
Furthermore, the occupational unit groups to which employees represented in 
the NES are coded are those of the KOS system rather than the OPCS/ONS 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). However, we have undertaken a 
recoding exercise in which the KOS unit groups have been allocated to the six 
employee classes of the ‘analytic’ version of NS-SEC, following as closely as 
possible the tables provided in regard to SOC2000 in the official manual (ONS, 
2002).  
 
This exercise provides the basis for Table 2 which indicates the relative 
importance of different components of gross weekly earnings in 1975 and 1998 
for men in each of the six classes distinguished who were in full-time 
employment.  
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Table 2: Components of Average Gross Weekly Earnings, Men in Full-Time Employment, 1975 and 1998 
 
 % total earnings % receiving 
   PBRa overtime shift etc other PBRa overtime shift etc 
    payb premiumsc   payb premiumsc 
NS-SEC Class 
1 Higher managerial 1975 0.9 1.5 0.4 97.2 3.9 9.9 3.2 
 and professional 1998d 4.3 1.8 0.4 92.5 12.2 11.3 3.2 
 
2 Lower managerial 1975 1.8 2.3 0.5 95.3 6.9 14.6 5.1 
 and professional 1998d 3.4 1.9 0.6 93.1 12.6 12.6 5.5 
 
3 Intermediate 1975 3.4 6.6 0.8 89.1 9.7 35.5 7.4 
  1998d 2.7 5.7 0.8 89.7 11.9 32.5 6.0 
 
5 Lower supervisory 1975 5.2 13.4 2.6 78.7 30.8 54.3 19.4 
 and technical 1998d 3.0 13.9 3.3 78.5 20.5 54.6 20.1 
 
6 Semi-routine 1975 9.9 13.7 4.2 72.3 38.3 53.2 28.4 
  1998d 3.9 13.1 4.3 77.7 26.9 49.2 28.9 
 
7 Routine 1975 10.1 14.7 2.3 72.9 49.6 57.3 19.1 
  1998d 4.4 14.1 2.2 78.1 22.7 52.5 15.3 
 
Notes:  
a. Includes piecework, bonuses and profit-related commissions and all other incentive payments not related to overtime. 
b. Relates to all pay for overtime hours, not just to premium elements.  
c. Includes pay for night or week-end work not treated as overtime. 
d. Because of deficiencies in the current version of the 1998 NES data-set, percentages in left-hand panel of the table sum to 98-99 rather than to 
100.  
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Two major points emerge. First, the relative importance of variable forms of 
pay clearly differs across classes. In particular, such pay accounts for, if not a 
negligible, still only a very slight proportion of the total earnings of men in the 
salariat – i.e. in Classes 1 and 2 – but for a far more significant proportion, 
upwards of 20 per cent, of the earnings of men in working-class positions – i.e. 
in Classes 6 and 7. It is, moreover, with men in these classes that variable pay is 
most likely to be underestimated through the inclusion in the ‘other’ category of 
the time-rate earnings of employees who have no standard hours of work. 
 
Secondly, such class differences do not show any very dramatic alteration over 
the period covered. The most notable change is the decline in importance of 
payment by results (PBR) for men in Classes 6 and 7, reflecting, one may 
suppose, the decreasing use of piece-rates; and, chiefly on this account, the 
proportion of the total earnings of these workers that falls in the ‘other’ pay 
category increases. It is also the case that among men in Classes 1 and 2 some 
evidence of a reverse tendency is apparent. Indeed, if attention is focused on the 
proportion of men receiving some part of their earnings in the form of PBR, 
then a marked narrowing in differences between the working class and the 
salariat might be claimed. None the less, it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that still in 1998 PBR accounted for under 5 per cent of the total earnings of 
men in Classes I and 2 and that the ‘other’ pay category – which in their case 
can be rather safely equated with basic pay – was little less dominant than in 
1975. In other words, the salariat clearly remains the salariat.10 
 
Comparable data to those of Table 2 can be produced for women but 
interpretation is more difficult in that the restriction of coverage to full-time 
employees is likely to be far more consequential than with men. In particular, 
this restriction would seem the most probable explanation for two findings that 
emerge: first, that, in all classes alike, variable forms of pay are less important 
than for men and second, that class differences are less marked overall. At the 
same time, though, the differences that do show up are on essentially the same 
pattern as those for men and, also as for men, changes over time are quite 
limited, with the declining importance of PBR for employees in Classes 6 and 7 
again showing up most strongly.11 
 
These findings on variable pay do then provide further grounds for scepticism 
over claims of the decline of class and, more specifically, of the erosion of 
distinctive features of the ‘service relationship’. Several authors have argued 
(e.g. Brown, 1995; Savage, 2000: ch. 6) that, as a result of the intensified 
competition of the global economy, remuneration on the basis of fixed salaries 
has to be modified. Pay must to an increasing degree be linked to performance, 
and for professional and managerial staff no less than for rank-and-file 
employees. From this point of view, the service relationship is seen not as 
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expressing an employment contract with a rather sophisticated underlying 
rationale but simply as a conventional status distinction that could be sustained 
during the long boom of the post-war years but that is now being swept aside as 
a new individualistic and entrepreneurial culture undermines that of old 
bureaucratic hierarchies. 
 
It is, however, surprising that, if such a development is in train, there are not 
more signs of it in the findings presented above. Although, as noted, PBR does 
increase in importance for men in Classes 1 and 2 as between 1975 and 1998, 
the change is more apparent in the numbers receiving some payment in this 
form than in the actual composition of their earnings. It can in fact be 
ascertained from the published results of the NES for 1998 (ONS 1998: Table 
D14) that within the salariat PBR amounted to more than 10 per cent of total 
earnings only among men in a few fairly specific occupational groups: that is, 
business professionals, such as brokers and investment analysts, and marketing 
and sales managers.12 Of course, if the data would allow a yet closer focus on, 
say, CEOs and others in very senior managerial positions, profit-related pay in 
particular could well take on much greater significance. But for professional and 
managerial employees at large, one must conclude that evidence to suggest that 
their mode of payment is now increasingly influenced by a new entrepreneurial 
ethos is scarcely compelling. 
 
In sum, while class differences in the stability of earnings may not be quite so 
marked nor so grave in their effects as in the past, there are clear enough 
indications that they still persist. For most members of the salariat, variation in 
earnings on a relatively short-term basis is unlikely to be a matter of much 
importance: the monthly pay slip will be fairly predictable. In contrast, for most 
blue-collar workers and, one may suppose, for members of the working class 
especially, at least the potential instability of pay remains a feature of their 
economic lives. The possibility, if not the actuality, of week-to-week fluctuation 
in earnings, even if now more related to hours worked and in particular to 
overtime working than to piece-rate payment, is still widely present. Weekly 
income will depend in some significant part both on the readiness of individuals 
to do overtime and, of course, on its availability.  
 
Finally, here, it should be kept in mind that the earnings of non-salaried workers 
are also liable to fluctuate in another way that the available data do not allow us 
to explore at all. That is, as a result of pay being lost through hours or days 
taken off on account of (at least uncertified) sickness, domestic or family 
problems etc. – a situation that would seem especially likely to arise in the case 
of women who work only part-time on account of their family responsibilities. 
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These differences in earnings stability – just as those in the risks of 
unemployment – can then be seen as stemming directly from the differences in 
employment relations in terms of which class is here defined. The basic labour 
contract, as an approximation to a spot contract for the purchase of a quantity of 
labour, requires that the work involved is such that it can be adequately 
measured and controlled – typically, that it entails physical rather than symbolic 
activity and that worker autonomy is low. If measurement is by output, piece-
rates with checks for quality are the obvious form of payment, while if 
measurement is by input, usually as indexed by time spent on the job, time-rates 
with checks for effort will apply. But, in either case, the underlying logic is that 
pay will indeed vary with the amount of work done.  
 
In contrast, the service relationship, implying a less specific, more diffuse 
exchange than a simple ‘money-for-effort’ bargain, is well adapted to 
circumstances where work is not easily measured or otherwise monitored – 
typically, where it entails symbolic rather than physical activity and worker 
autonomy is high. The logic of the service relationship is that the commitment 
of employees to organisational goals is gained and appropriate incentives are 
created through payment by salary that is not subject to short-term fluctuation, 
but that can be expected steadily to increase in its level, conditional upon 
satisfactory appraisal of a relatively long-term kind, over most of the 
individual’s working life.13 
 
Finally, here, it should be noted that the foregoing relates entirely to earnings 
stability among members of employee classes, to whom the coverage of NES is 
restricted. There is in fact little information available on the stability of earnings 
of small employers or the self-employed. If, however, any supposition were to 
be made in this regard, it could only be that among such independents – as 
comprised by Class IV of the Goldthorpe schema or Class 4 of NS-SEC – 
fluctuation in earnings will be significantly greater than among employees in 
general, and again as a direct consequence of the relations that characterise their 
class position (cf. Boden and Corden, 1994). Rather than receiving salaries or 
wages from an employer, independents generate their own earnings through 
their market transactions with customers or clients, and also with suppliers, 
creditors and their own employees, under economic conditions that are subject 
to a wide range of variation. Qualitative studies of small entrepreneurs, 
shopkeepers, self-employed artisans and the like have indicated that maintaining 
custom or ‘the flow of work’ is a frequent preoccupation, and that the 
uncertainty of earnings tends to create problems in both business planning and 
family budgeting (e.g. Scase and Goffee, 1980, 1982). 
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Economic prospects 
In considering the consequences of class for economic security and economic 
stability, the risks of unemployment and the likelihood of short-term fluctuation 
in earnings, respectively, have served as empirical referents. As regards 
economic prospects, these will be indexed by the relationship that exists 
between earnings and age. 
 
Economists have for long recognised that earnings tend to follow a parabolic 
curve with age, first rising and then later levelling out and falling off somewhat. 
However, far less attention has been given (a notable exception is Phelps 
Brown, 1977: ch. 8) to the fact that the particular shapes of age-earnings curves 
vary across different groups of employees. What, for present purposes, is of 
chief interest is the extent and persistence of such variation as it occurs across 
classes. The NES data-set and the recoding exercise referred to in the previous 
section again allow relevant analyses to be made, and in this case a comparison 
is possible between 1975 and 1999. 
 
Figure 3 graphs 1975 median gross weekly earnings for three-year age-groups 
of men in full time employment in each of the six employee classes of NS-SEC. 
As is indicated, these earnings are expressed in 1999 prices so that comparisons 
with that year can be made in real terms.14 
 
Figure 3: Men in full time employment in 1975 – median gross weekly 
earnings in 1999 prices 
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It is important that this and subsequent similar figures are carefully interpreted. 
The graphs derive from cross-sectional data. Thus, they should be understood as 
showing what in a certain year employees within a certain class and of a certain 
age were, on average, earning. Given our primary concern with the structural 
effects of class position, it is in fact this information that is of chief relevance. 
By the same token, the graphs should not be read as tracing out the lifetime 
earnings of particular individuals. Apart from anything else, mobility between 
classes does of course occur during working life, and any analysis of the course 
of lifetime earnings of individuals would have to take such mobility into 
account.15  
 
Furthermore, at the same time as they show age-effects, the graphs will also 
reflect birth-cohort effects (which could be important if members of successive 
cohorts have experienced contrasting economic fortunes) and also, and 
especially towards their tails, various selection effects. Such complicating 
factors have always to be kept in mind, and attention should focus on the larger 
features of the different curves that are depicted. 
 
From Figure 3 the following points most clearly emerge. First, up to around age 
25 class differences in earnings are rather slight. Young professionals and 
managers earn little more than young wage-workers in routine jobs, and rates of 
increase in earnings are also similar. Secondly, though, from the mid-20s 
onwards the curves begin to diverge. Those for Classes 6 and 7 rise only up to 
around age 30 and then remain more or less flat before tending to slope 
downwards somewhat as men pass 50. However, the curves for both 
intermediate classes, Class 3 and Class 5, and also that for the lower-level 
salariat, Class 2, show a rise that continues well into the 30s before levelling 
out. And, in most marked contrast, the curve for the higher-level salariat, Class 
1, rises quite sharply up the late 30s and then more slowly and irregularly into 
the 50s before declining after age 55.16 
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Figure 4: Men in full time employment in 1999 – median gross weekly 
earnings in 1999 prices 
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In Figure 4 corresponding results to those of Figure 3 are shown for 1999. It is 
apparent (note the changed vertical scale) that real earnings have increased and 
also that class inequalities have at the same time widened – as one would expect 
to find in the light of other analyses of earnings over the period covered (e.g. 
Gosling, Machin and Meghir, 1994; Johnson and Makepeace, 1997). However, 
of chief concern here is what has happened to the shape of the class curves.  
 
The curves for Classes 6 and 7, the two divisions of the working class, reveal 
rather little change. They rise for slightly longer than in 1975 – i.e. now up to 
the mid-30s – but then remain essentially flat until their eventual decline for 
older age-groups, essentially as before. Similarly, the curve for Class 1 is not 
greatly altered. It again shows a sharp rise up to the late 30s followed by a 
slower increase – possibly less sustained than in the earlier graph – before 
turning down from the mid-50s. Changes of greater consequence are in fact 
restricted to the curves lying between those for Classes 6 and 7 and that for 
Class 1. Thus, the curves for Classes 3 and 5 show somewhat longer periods of 
increase in 1999 than in 1975 – i.e. ones continuing up to around age 40 – and 
that for Class 3 does in fact rise above that for Class 5 between the ages of 30 
and 50 while in 1975 it remained always below.17 However, it is the change in 
shape of the curve for Class 2 that is most significant. In 1999 this curve is 
much more similar to that for Class 1 than it was in 1975. It too now rises 
sharply into the 30s and then more slowly into the 50s. In other words, so far as 
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economic prospects are concerned, there is here evidence of some 
‘consolidation’ of the salariat.  
 
Figures 5 and 6 then present comparable graphs to those of Figures 3 and 4 for 
women in full-time employment. Two minor differences in format are that five-
year rather than three-year age-groups are used, because of the smaller numbers 
involved, and that the age-range covered extends only to 52-6 because of the 
tendency of women to retire earlier than men. 
 
If Figure 5 is compared, first of all, with Figure 3, it can be seen that in 1975 
age-earnings curves for women were less differentiated by class than were those 
for men. The curves for women in Classes 3 and 5, as well as those for women 
in Classes 6 and 7, are essentially flat after a slight rise up to the mid-20s. And 
further the curves for women in Classes 1 and 2 are distinctive only in that 
earnings increase, and rather more sharply, up to around age 30. 
 
Figure 5: Women in full time employment in 1975 – median gross weekly 
earnings in 1999 prices 
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Figure 6: Women in full time employment in 1999 – median gross weekly 
earnings in 1999 prices 
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However, if Figure 5 is then compared with Figure 6, it is apparent that by 1999 
not only had class inequalities in earnings widened among women, as among 
men, but that at the same time greater differences in the shapes of class curves 
had developed. And in turn the comparison of Figure 6 with Figure 4 then 
serves to show that this differentiation is for the most part on similar lines to 
that found among men. In particular, there is now the same marked contrast 
between the working class and the salariat: i.e. between, on the one hand, the 
curves for Classes 6 and 7 that remain largely flat after the 20s and, on the 
other, the curve for Class 1 that now rises steeply up to around age 40 and that 
for Class 2 that shows a slower though apparently more sustained rise.  
 
The only gender difference of note occurs with Class 3, that of intermediate 
white-collar workers, in which a high proportion of women employees are of 
course found. For men, the Class 3 curve, as earlier observed, moved somewhat 
closer between 1975 and 1999 to that for Classes 1 and 2, at least in rising quite 
sharply up to age 40. But for women no such change is revealed: in 1999 as in 
1975 the Class 3 curve essentially follows the Class 6 and 7, or working-class, 
trajectory.18 
 
In sum, it can be shown that class differences in age-earnings curves exist and, 
further, that, in so far as changes have occurred over the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, these have tended to make such differences more rather than 
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less apparent. In 1975 the most marked contrast was that found, in the case of 
men, between earnings within the working class, which did not increase with 
age after the 20s, and earnings within the higher salariat, which increased until a 
quite late stage in working life. In 1999 this contrast remains and has also 
become evident among women as well as men. Furthermore, for men and 
women alike, the lower salariat is now clearly differentiated from the working 
class on much the same lines as the higher salariat.19 
 
To repeat, what this means in terms of the economic prospects of particular 
individuals will depend in part on their chances of mobility. However, it is 
known that rates of worklife class mobility do fall off rather sharply for 
individuals in their 30s (Goldthorpe, 1987: ch. 6; Gershuny, 1993), and thus, for 
individuals who have reached this age, some fairly clear implications can be 
spelled out. In particular, for men who are still at this stage in their lives in 
working-class positions or for women in working-class or intermediate-class 
positions, their expectations of any further improvement in the level of their real 
earnings must be regarded as poor, apart from that which may result from 
general economic growth. In contrast, for those individuals who have achieved 
positions in the salariat – from which downward mobility in the course of 
working life is rather rare – there are good expectations that their real earnings 
will steadily increase at least up to some time in their 50s.  
 
Once more, then, the empirical evidence produced is scarcely consistent with 
claims of declining class differences and, in particular, with the claim of the 
demise of the professional or managerial career. In this regard, particular 
comment must be made on Savage’s attempt (2000: ch. 3) to use NES data as a 
basis for furthering his argument of the erosion of the service relationship – an 
attempt which is not in fact at all convincing. 
 
Savage computes for 1976 and 1990 (using the published, not original data for 
these years) the extent to which men aged 40-49 earn more than the average for 
their occupational group (not class), and then takes this ‘age premium’ as an 
indicator of how far a service relationship, implying rising earnings over most 
of working life, is in operation. He finds that the age premium that professionals 
and managers enjoy over most manual workers is rather small and tending to 
fall over the period covered. However, calculating summary measures of this 
kind is a poor substitute for looking at age-earnings curves per se. And in any 
event Savage fails to provide a clear rationale for the particular measure that he 
adopts – various alternatives to which could be suggested. For example, it 
would seem more direct to calculate the ratio of the earnings of employees aged, 
say, 50-55 to the earnings of those aged 23-28. And if this is done for each NS-
SEC class for the period 1975 to 1999, then conclusions generally in line with 
those set out above, and at variance with Savage’s own, are indicated.20 
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Rather than pointing to the erosion of the service relationship, the relevant 
curves of Figures 3 to 6 can in fact be taken as well illustrating the 
consequences for earnings that follow from its operation. As earlier argued, the 
service relationship can be understood as a response by employers to problems 
of work monitoring and human asset specificity, through which is created an 
expectation of continuity of employment and also appropriate incentives for 
employees to act consistently in the pursuit of organisational goals. An age-
earnings curve that moves upwards over much of working life is an important 
element in the logic of this relationship. On the one hand, employees know that 
the better they perform, the quicker and further their promotion is likely to be 
into the better-paid levels of the hierarchy. On the other hand, because for most 
employees higher rewards will still lie ahead, ‘hasty quits’ are discouraged and 
also the threat of dismissal, as, say, for manifest under-performance or 
malfeasance, is made more potent. 
 
In sum, for so long as the service relationship remains an effective response to 
problems that are most widely associated with the employment of professional 
and managerial staff, class differences in economic prospects, and ones 
especially marked as between the salariat and the body of wage-workers, can be 
expected to persist. 
 
Finally, separate attention needs here again to be given to small employers and 
the self-employed whose economic prospects, as indexed through age-earnings 
curves, cannot be treated on the basis of the NES. Some relevant social survey 
data are in this case available, although independents are known to be reluctant 
to respond to questions on their incomes (in part, it seems, because they are 
often not themselves well-informed on the matter). Probably the best present-
day source – there is no good basis for over-time comparisons – is the British 
Household Panel Study (cf. Meager, Court and Moralee, 1996), which achieves 
a response rate for the earnings of independents of around 50 per cent. 
 
Drawing on the BHPS data-set, it is possible to show, as in Figure, 7, the 
median reported annual ‘labour incomes’ (1999-2000) for five-year age-groups 
of men falling into Goldthorpe Class IV (similar analyses for women could not 
usefully be undertaken because of inadequate numbers).21 Since it is annual 
rather than weekly earnings that are here plotted, the curve with age appears 
more pronounced than in the figures previously presented. But if derived 
weekly earnings were to be shown on Figure 4 above – i.e. that for male 
employees in 1999 – the curve would in fact rather closely follow those for 
Classes 6 and 7 over the age-range 32-49, although falling below for both the 
earlier and later ranges.  
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Figure 7: Men in Class IV – median reported annual labour income – 1999-
2000 
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That the earnings of members of Class IV would thus appear as being, at best, 
only at the same level as those of primarily manual wage-workers suggests 
some significant degree of under-reporting, as indeed has been found in studies 
that have focused on this issue (cf. Meager and Bates, 2001); and any 
reasonable correction made in the light of these studies would in fact lead to 
Class IV earnings being placed somewhere in-between those for Class 5 and 
Class 6 for all except the youngest and oldest age groups.22 However, for 
present purposes, it is the general shape of the curve of Figure 7 that is of chief 
significance. While this shows a rate of increase over younger age-groups 
similar to that for intermediate white-collar employees or even the lower 
salariat, it is more distinctive in the rate and extent of its subsequent decline. 
Selection effects are very likely to be involved here. The probability of self-
employment in relation to age has been shown to be non-linear, first rising then 
falling in later life (Rees and Shah, 1986), and self-employed craftsmen in 
particular would seem inclined to opt for wage work as middle age approaches 
(Scase and Goffee, 1982: ch. 4). But what is more generally reflected, one may 
suppose, is a tendency for older independents, whether out of choice or 
constraint, to take on less business and to work shorter hours than they did when 
of prime age: that is to say, either because they can afford to enjoy more leisure 
or because of diminishing powers. In this respect, both the advantages and 
disadvantages of the economic position of independents are well brought out. 
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Conclusions 
It has been shown that if class positions are defined by reference to employment 
relations, then the experience of individuals in terms of economic security, 
stability and prospects will typically differ with the class positions that they 
hold. At least with some of the more marked contrasts that in this way arise, 
individuals in different class positions could in fact be seen as living in quite 
different economic worlds, not just as regards their levels of material welfare 
but, further, as regards the whole range of economic life-chances – of risks and 
opportunities – that they face. 
 
From a methodological standpoint, the findings presented above thus provide 
additional confirmation of the validity and utility of conceptualising class in the 
way in question (cf. also Rose and Pevalin, 2003). More substantively, they 
throw further doubt on claims of the decline or death of class in modern – or, 
supposedly, ‘post-modern’ – societies such as that of contemporary Britain. 
What is rather indicated is the general persistence, and in some respects even 
the heightening, of inequalities that can be shown to derive directly from the 
incumbency of different class positions: that is, not from the attributes of 
individuals per se but from their location within the social relations of labour 
markets and productions units that form the class structure as here understood. 
 
Finally, then, and from the standpoint of the present volume in particular, the 
value of taking a class structural context for the study of economic and social 
mobility may be underlined. A clear distinction can in this way be established 
between ‘positions’ and ‘persons’: class positions represent the ‘empty places’ 
(cf. Sørensen, 1991) among which the mobility of individuals (or families) 
occurs. But further, as well as thus providing a framework within which rates 
and patterns of mobility can be observed and measured, a class structural 
perspective also provides a natural starting point for the explanation of these 
rates and patterns. In so far as individuals in different classes do inhabit 
different economic worlds, as characterised by security, stability and prospects, 
then not only can their class positions be seen as constraining their life-chances 
in regard to mobility – as in a range of other respects – but, further, as shaping 
the life-choices that they make within such constraints, as, for example, their 
educational and occupational choices.  
 
What has of late become increasingly apparent is that where fairly systematic 
class differences in patterns of such choice are empirically demonstrable, it is 
possible to provide causally adequate accounts in terms of individuals’ 
rationally adaptive responses to features of the class situations that they 
typically face – or, more specifically, in terms of their attitudes to risk, their 
propensity to discount the future, their sense of personal adequacy and so on 
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(Goldthorpe, 2000: chs. 8, 9, 11; Jonsson and Erikson, 2000; Breen, 2001; 
Bowles and Gintis, 2002). 
 
Explanations on these lines often help in understanding why class-linked 
patterns of choice should persist over time and, in turn, the marked self-
maintaining properties that inequalities of opportunity and social mobility 
regimes often appear to possess. Such explanations can, moreover, claim to be 
ones given at a more fundamental level than those that rely merely on the 
invocation of class cultures or subcultures. Explanations of this latter kind often 
struggle to avoid tautology – that is, through inferring cultural values and 
derived social norms from the very patterns of action to which they are 
addressed; and in any event they leave unanswered the question of just why 
individuals should tend to act in accordance with such values and norms rather 
than deviating from them. In contrast, explanations that are able to show at least 
the subjective rationality of individuals’ actions, given their class situations, 
come closer to what Boudon (2003) has called ‘final’ explanations or 
‘explanations without black boxes’. They offer accounts both of typical patterns 
of action and at the same time – by revealing their adaptive qualities – of the 
particular values and norms by which such action would appear to be informed. 
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Notes 
 
1  It may be noted that corresponding classes of the Goldthorpe schema and of the NS-
SEC in this version carry the same number, roman in the former case, arabic in the 
latter. This distinction will serve to make it clear in the text which classification is at 
any point being used. At the five-class level, to which the common descriptive terms 
are applied, the class allocation of individuals shows almost 90 per cent continuity 
between the two systems. 
2  The implicit provisions of employment contracts can be defined as informal but 
shared understandings between employers and employees, usually concerning how 
each will respond to contingencies, that are backed not by law but rather by the 
parties’ reputations. 
3  Although in earlier work the term ‘service class’ (a direct translation, attributable to 
Ralf Dahrendorf, of the German Dienstklasse) has been generally used, ‘salariat’ may 
be preferable in order to avoid any confusion with the service sector or workers in 
services. 
4  As can be seen from Figure 1, the class of intermediate white-collar workers (III or 3) 
is located, somewhat speculatively, in the lower-right quadrant, where work 
monitoring problems dominate over asset specificity problems, while the class of 
intermediate blue-collar occupations (V or 5) is located in the upper-left quadrant 
where the reverse applies. The former situation could be expected to lead to a form of 
contract in which some departure from the exchange of discrete amounts of money 
and effort, characteristic of the basic labour contract, would be more apparent than 
features directed towards furthering a long-term relationship, while the latter situation 
would be expected to lead to a still fairly specific money-for-effort bargain but 
combined with understandings, if only implicit, about the desirability of continuity 
(see further Goldthorpe, 2000: 221-3). 
5  The lower risks of unemployment of intermediate white-collar employees as 
compared with intermediate blue-collar employees might appear to go contrary to the 
expectation indicated in the previous note that the latter would be the more likely to 
have contracts in which understandings on continuity of employment would figure. 
However, from analyses undertaken by Gallie et al. in the study previously referred 
to, which did take in Classes III and V but which were not published, different results 
emerged (for sight of which we are indebted to Mark Tomlinson). Although the 
relative risks of becoming unemployed for members of these classes fluctuated a good 
deal over the period covered – while always falling in-between those for the working 
class and the salariat – the risks for Class III were on the whole higher. Further 
investigation of this issue is required. 
6  Data from the British Labour Force survey collected in the course of research aimed 
at the validation of NS-SEC are revealing in this regard. The proportion of individuals 
working to one month’s notice or more falls steadily across the employee classes as 
follows: Class 1, 89%; Class 2, 78%; Class 3, 69%; Class 5, 38%; Class 6, 29% and 
Class 7, 17% (Rose and O’Reilly, 1997). 
7  For example, level of qualification may be regarded as affecting the risk of 
unemployment largely via its influence on the type of employment, and thus the class 
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positions, to which individuals gain access; and structural factors such as industry or 
organisational size would appear chiefly of significance in determining the incidence 
of unemployment within classes. A further set of variables that would need to be 
taken into account in a comparative perspective would be those relating to nationally-
specific institutional arrangements as these bear on labour market regulation, 
education and training, social security provision etc. It is, however, a mistake to see it 
as a weakness of class theory – as apparently does Esping-Andersen (1993: 8) – that it 
does not itself attempt to incorporate such institutional influences but remains ‘nested 
in an institutionally “naked” world’. Class theory, at least as here understood, is 
concerned with the basic logic of the differentiation of employment contracts; and in 
order then to be able to investigate empirically how far – and with what consequences 
– this logic may be modified by institutional variation, it is essential that the latter 
should be kept conceptually separate. From this point of view, highly relevant British-
Italian and British-German studies are Bernadi et al. (2000) and McGinnity and 
Helmert (2002).  
8  Some problems of sampling and employer non-compliance in the NES have been 
noted (Micklewright and Trinder, 1981; Atkinson, Micklewright and Stern, 1988; 
Elias and Gregory, 1994) but would not seem serious at least in regard to the use of 
the data that is here made. 
9  The only other variable element included in total gross earnings would appear to be 
that of ‘tips and gratuities’, in so far as these are shown in employers’ pay records. 
10  It should be noted that the results here reported from the NES – and likewise those 
reported in the next section of the paper – do of course refer only to employees and 
thus do not cover the small numbers of employers and self-employed professionals 
who, as indicated in Table 1, are also included in Classes 1 and 2. 
11  These findings for women are available on request. It should be added that although 
NES does collect information on part-time employees, male and female, that could in 
principle be analysed, it is in the case of part-time, and lower-paid part-time, workers 
especially that doubts about the representativeness of NES data appear most serious 
(Elias and Gregory, 1994). 
12  Michael White has suggested (personal communication) that that the tendency for 
PBR to be increasingly used for professionals and managers, though only in a very 
marginal way, can best be seen a ‘token’ response by many organisations to passing 
fashion among management consultants and business gurus. It is further important to 
note here that some changes that are claimed in the employment relations of 
professional and managerial staff (cf. Savage, 2000: 140-1), such as a shift from more 
or less automatic progress along incremental salary scales to regular individual 
appraisals as a basis for salary setting, together with ‘fast-tracking’ and widening pay 
differentials between grades, are not at all incompatible with the logic of service 
relationship – the key idea in which is that effective service to the employing 
organisation should be rewarded by career advancement. It is in fact likely that there 
has always been a good deal of variation among employing organisations in the ways 
in which such advancement, whether via salary increments or promotion, is 
determined. 
13  See further Goldthorpe (2000b: ch. 10). The issues that arise here have been 
extensively discussed in the literature of the ‘new’ institutional and managerial 
economics under the rubric of ‘principal-agent’ problems (see e.g. Eggertsson, 1990; 
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Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; and Gibbons, 1997). 
Had those sociologists claiming the erosion of the service relationship attended more 
to this literature, they might have better appreciated that with professional and 
managerial employees not only will PBR systems often be difficult to operate but may 
in fact have unintended adverse consequences. In particular, if the limited number of 
performance indicators that such systems can comprise does not cover the complete 
range of work tasks and roles that employees are expected to fulfil, then not just the 
level of their effort but also its distribution will be affected – and in ways that need 
not be optimal from the employer’s point of view. Employers may ‘get what they pay 
for’ in an all-too-literal sense. 
14  Data are also available on gross hourly earnings. For our present purposes, we have 
opted for weekly earnings since hours of work reported are contractual rather than 
actual hours, and the fact that for professionals and managers the latter may much 
exceed the former might be thought to lead to some exaggeration of class differences. 
However, we have in fact repeated the analyses reported in the text using hourly 
earnings, and no major differences in the pattern of results emerge. 
15  We hope to move on to this kind of analysis in future work. Data linkage procedures 
do in principle allow the earnings and employment histories of individuals covered by 
the NES to be constructed. Preliminary investigations by Elias and Gregory (1994) 
point to various technical problems but also suggest, interestingly, that the main 
features of cross-sectional analyses tend in fact to be replicated by longitudinal 
analyses. 
16  It should be recognised that the very small class differences in earnings in the 
youngest age-groups will be subject to selection effects in regard to education and that 
selection effects in relation to early retirement may also play a part where curves turn 
down for older age-groups. The latter tendency could also illustrate birth cohort 
effects: i.e. where members of a particular class and cohort ‘carry with them’ a certain 
historic level of earnings that, in a context of, say, generally rising earnings, 
individuals in similar class positions in following cohorts will exceed. 
17  In the case of the curve for Class 3, which in 1999 declines rather more sharply from 
around age 40 than in 1975, one may suspect the rather strong operation of selection 
effects associated with worklife mobility. For men, the intermediate white-collar 
positions comprised by this class are known to have relatively low ‘holding power’ 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: ch. 6), often in fact serving as stepping-stones for 
upward mobility into managerial positions in Classes 1 and 2. In turn, men who are 
found in Class 3 in later life would seem likely to be holding relatively inferior 
positions in terms of pay (perhaps ones to which they were promoted after spending 
most of their lives in manual wage-earning jobs) and/or to have themselves rather low 
earning potential. 
18  In contrast to the situation for men as described in the previous note, in the case of 
women Class 3 positions appear to have quite high ‘holding-power’. 
19  For all the graphs presented we have calculated 95% confidence intervals which turn 
out to be generally very narrow. We have also examined in the case of the salariat 
whether differences in age-wage curves show up as between professional and 
managerial groupings, since some authors (e.g. Savage et al., 1992) have argued that 
professionals and managers typically dispose of different kinds of ‘assets’ in labour 
markets and should therefore be regarded as holding different class positions. It 
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emerges that with Classes I and 2 alike the curves for the two groupings follow each 
other very closely – although while in 1975 those for professionals tend at most ages 
to be slightly above those for managers, the reverse holds in 1999. (All results 
referred to in this note are available from the authors on request.) 
20  For example, it turns out that for men in Class 1 these ratios are little changed over the 
period covered: the earnings of men age 50-55 were 148 per cent of those of men 
aged 23-28 in 1975 and 145 per cent in 1999. For men in Class 2 the ratio actually 
increases over time, consistently with the suggestion made in the text concerning the 
consolidation of the salariat, from 126 per cent in 1975 to 139 per cent in 1999. It is 
true that an increase does also occur with men in Classes 6+7, from 102 per cent in 
1975 to 116 per cent in 1999. But what is being picked up here – as also in Savage’s 
measure – is the tendency apparent from Figures 3 and 4, and commented on in the 
text, for the earnings of manual wage workers to rise for slightly longer in 1999 than 
in 1975: i.e. up to around 30+ rather than 25+, which, though of some interest in 
itself, does not of course provide any evidence of the erosion of the service 
relationship. The results for women are similarly in line with the main conclusions 
drawn in the text from the curves of Figures 5 and 6. 
21  Tak Wing Chan provided generous assistance in extracting the data on which Figure 7 
is based.  
22  In the light of existing research, Meager and Bates (2001) suggest that the extent of 
under-reporting lies between a third and a sixth. It should also be noted that there is 
general agreement that the earnings of the self-employed show greater dispersion than 
those of employees (see e.g. Meager, Court and Moralee, 1996), although this 
dispersion will be heightened if, as in the work of Meager and his colleagues, self-
employed professionals are considered together with the small employers and self-
employed workers who constitute Class IV. 
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